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An Introduction to Complete
Markets
I
HE PAST TWO DECADES have seen a pro-
liferation of new and often complex financial ~yHm~ Saths Starts SeIiin~New
securities and commodity contracts iii the mar- W~1~F nts Rettin$ Yen vs. Mark
ketplace. Flipping through the financial pages of ____________
the newspaper, one finds, for example, that an
investor can purchase the right to buy (at a fixed ~ WALL TRFZT JOURN Staff Itcpener
price on a set future date) a futures contract on ~ f~f~J4~a tis ti lipgsn lb Slion
10-year U.S. Treasury notes. Alternatively, one ant Sh,So i~ a w lit q b t di
reads of a contract that pays off various dollar S°~ 3/eriiWflStftti~lbe against Lie tnatslnerk
amounts depending on the level of the mark- d~’~SbColdtnanh thqy be
yen exchange rate at the end of October 1992 ~o f the coat
(see shaded insert at right). Are such arcana niuni ~ ompan nap o th off t-ing F
practically useful? The theory of complete & 0 0 an W at nold I
- A carding to e optic r 4 eare li-st markets—an important element of modern ~ e . thu ghsitch
theoretical economics—can provide some arrantutsateb oldra ope Thew ant tartedtrading
insight.’ yasterday is the e’ V Ic Stoc oh nga
01 ra F options ga hotter thengh hut b
A complete system of markets is one in which itt o6liga e oh er II securt,e tnt xi iesarid oth
there is a market for every good. This simple ‘ *t tP~ithpnceonorhe Fe athda Tb
-- - ap’ n i mor ompli dbe a ext nit’ olderstob
statement conceals the significance of the con- ~ ~ ~i~oforean sire ivithap of
cept, however, by failing to specify what is i dol
meant by a “good.” By carefully defining “good” Th Walt t oxtrualpe babe a 41* 1 ofcit rate
to include the date and environment in which a between nosi cur i iu amp the to gt o a m
-- - sterdavw 8 68 yantobu ooema Ic
commodity is consumed, economists are able to Thew ran nfl anitive tortoapavni nfl U. d fist
consider consumption, production and invest- numb v atopu haseanent tIcdrop el iv So20
ment choices in a multiperiod, uncertain world. T ts alueo thewar ntssc tutu edfrorn foi-nrnla
- p Li warrant p o pecitis Each vat aittun ally’~ ill Moreover, they can do so using largely the same ~ $ ~ ~ aria e pireso~ o 80
utility theory originally developed to analyze ~l~nof tIe l000wa i Wilinu Liar
timeless certainty. In particular, state-preference iii ltpw tiontb ea e e can tyle i-ran an
theory, which was developed to analyze the Li do yb sirs ay ReM wilini obeabi
-. - Se ti fit 8’ floart oh rxvsto
completeness of a system of markets, is a pow-
‘To be correct, one should refer to a “complete system of “complete market.” These three terms are used inter-
markets.” This phrase can be unwieldy at times, however, changeably here (see glossary).
and it is usually abbreviated to “complete markets” or
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.\rbitrage .~ collection of pavoll n 101’s ~\ liii it~of p~i~ oIl au oss stales see ~ilso
zero net osI Vt 110’”’ net P’~.)oils ill ciII out— .‘-pPtIJIHIP).
rOflW~3! P non—negative ~mciriot all iero In
othei t~oi ci a set ol tr ansacLions tliaL re— Inc oniplete market: ~t s~ stem of niai’kets
stills in getting something liii- nuIliiri~,. Vt hit h is not I omplc’te
A rron -lJc’brcu seruritt S~tnieas pun- l.iiu’ax t’oiuhirti tioxi A (?(‘toi’ pi ixiric Cl by I I seem-itt. atliiing (or sub Li ac-tn gi t~Ic menI hi ele-
Ret: \ ontrac r it hose payoff’, are a coristani nieiit, ant sralar multiples of hi o or 111011’
itiotint in all otitcoiiits that iiI’P t’lt’itieiits otlici ‘—(‘(‘lois.
ol a specified ci mt inclzero in all othex -
I meat lv independent \ set ot ec-tors is liii— otitconies. I-ui etaniple ,t t oiilrat’t thit -- -
i’s ott S5 in the Nexit - \I it ins • alit] ZPIO r 1> inch’; jendent ii 110 t et Lot in the Wi
- can he c’xpr’esWcl as a linear tonil,mnatioii citlirrit se b a bet
ol liii athPr \ ttUii s Iii tin’ 5( ‘I
all optu 1fF -‘ contract git log 11w holdem the
right to IJLJ~ 1 ~tti tIc tihW good at a ; )i’eS~W- 0 fiion: See call option and put option
t.rfini luture date trw a presp citied pi it e
(see -il Sc) put oj,th~ - ( )u L( 1 me ~ coin~ ilele spec ificati Hi il the
i-eatizatwos of ~tl I i eit’i ant a riables over
rimpie It’ max ket: A sys I ciii cit inaik eIs fl tin en Lii-v n-in ant tinir horizon see a l-,o
“ Iut Ii vi P1% agetu L is Li I)Ic to t’.~cchange (Jvl~ vi en good, ither di I_Pc tlt lii intl rec liv
with evt-rt other’ agetit \lsit c’aJIetl ~itoni— I’aic’to—optinal allocation An alIo(anon of
plele s~ sU ni cit 111th kets. crononi ic resources among individuals ~ Stetit odds: Belt irig odds on some col- slitii that no I ruclit mdci -ii can lip n iade bet Ic
Ic’i -t 11)11 of events that al-I’ inverseit i-ciated ~fi WitIiout iiia kitig some cither i idi it] ual
to a probahiliii iiiea5UI’(’ citer t Ilose PtCI) t S Vt Disc ol f
according to the torniula ()~— (1. PU-I) — 1 Pat off vector- .\ vet-Iin ichose c’lenients I ep- where D~ is the odds on the eveiit e a rid rosen L the amount paid of eat h good in
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lien t: ~. ciillection of outcomes. lot etatnple Pure security At’onLiar L thaI payc Citt tine
.
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Nphecd tS~ mail. ~Qrdifbrtgocd)underdlfft
that \l?0Mt~t\pi ~eiiQ ~othwqbt
narcrnn a flQf\\ N
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pled * tt lb an
erful tool with which to study behavior under
uncertainty.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the
non-specialist to the basic theory of complete
markets, providing the reader with an insight
into the nature of markets and recent financial
innovations in particular. The paper first intro-
duces the major concepts of the state-prefer-
ence approach to uncertainty, illustrating them
with a parimutuel gambling example. In this
framework, the notion of completeness arises
naturally as the extreme case in which bettors
have the greatest range of opportunities to bet
on the outcome of a race. The terminology is
then transferred to an economic context) where
again, complete markets provide consumers,
producers and investors the most flexibility in
allocating payoffs and planning for uncertain
contingencies. Particular attention is given to
the markets for futures and options.
Such securities are shown to improve the effi-
ciency of the marketplace, a result with implica-
tions for regulatory policy.
In the real world, systems of markets are not
complete, as we shall seeThe notion of com-
pleteness, however, is of interest for two rea-
sons. First, it serves as a theoretical benchmark,
relative to which incompleteness can be assess-
ed; such a comparison might, for example, sug-
gest whether incompleteness implies inefficiency
in a particular model. Second, although the no-
tion of market completeness appears most often
in theoretical discussions, the ideas involved can
also be applied to more realistic problems. For
example, in the state-preference context, mar-
kets for so-called “derivative” securities — fu-
tures and options — add value by providing
investors with flexibility in fashioning their
portfolios; thus, they make systems of markets
less incomplete. The popularity of such securi-
ties can thus be explained from a theoretical
perspective that incorporates complete markets.
in some cases, the theory can even suggest
new markets that would alleviate existing
incompleteness.
THE THEORETICAL APPARATUS
The tools and results of the theory of com-
plete markets represent one the most significant
developments of theoretical economics in this
century.2 At the same time, the concepts enihed-
ded in the theory are very general and have
been used in many other economic contexts.
Thus, our first task is to explore the basic struc-
ture of state-preference theory. We do this with
a simple gambling example, because it involves
a well-defined and relatively small collection
of outcomes and payoffs in an uncertain
environment.3
2The theory can be traced to the work of Arrow (1964),
Debreu (1959), Arrow & Debreu (1954) and Mckenzie
(1954) in the mid-1950s. Both Arrow and Debreu were
later awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics
(Arrow in 1972, Debreu in 1983), largely for their work in
developing the theory of complete markets and applying it
to the problem of general equilibrium. The theory is often
cited in the guise of its two most common avatars, the
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory and state-
preference theory; it also often appears as its implicit
counterpart, the theory of incomplete markets. The mitera-
ture applying state-preference theory and the theory of
complete markets is lengthy; for a partial list, consult the
references in Radner (1982) and Debreu (1982).
Previous articles have recognized the connection between
gambling and economic activity, especially financial
markets. See, for example, Gabriel & Marsden (1990) or






















State-Claims Defined T-M-C, T-C-M, M-T-C, M-C-T, C-T-M, C-M-T6 Al-
One dominant theme of state-preference
theory and complete markets is uncertainty,
though we may have definite opinions at the
start of the day, we cannot know the state of




State-preference theory incorporates uncertainty
by defining outcomes, or potential future states,
only one of which will ultimately be realized,
The theory has been fruitfully applied in many
areas of economics, especially in the study of
financial markets. For now, however, consider
An event is a collection of one or more states,
‘Fhus, for example, “Mastercharger wins the
- race” is an event, It includes two states, M-T-C
and M-C-T, both of which are consistent with
the stated criterion,
an imaginary racetrack called Portfolio Downs. All bets are placed on events. If the state of
We are bettors at Portfolio Downs, hoping to
win enough for an early retirement. To make
our life simpler, the track’s management has
done away with the tote board.~Instead, all
bets are placed at fixed odds with the track’s of-
ficial bookmaker. This allows us to confine our
uncertainty to the race itself, without worrying
that the posted odds might shift after we’ve
the world that ultimately occurs is an element
of the event, then the bet pays off at the fixed
odds; otherwise the bet pays nothing. Bets are a
special type of state-contingent claim (or simply
state claim). More generally, a state claim is a
contract that pays off differing amounts—per-
haps even different goods—under different
states of the world.
I ~
placed a bet. Furthermore, to keep the number
of contingencies to a minimum, only one race
will be run today.
Our first assignment at the track is to define
the set of relevant states and payoffs. A state
of the world is defined as a complete specifica-
tion of the values of all relevant variables over
A state claim can be represented as a payoff
vector with one element for each state of the
tvorld. The notion of a payoff vector, central to
the theory of complete markets, is stated in
terms of the mathematics of vectors, linear alge-
bra! In our example, a $2 bet on Mastercharger
to win that pays off at 4-to-i odds can be repre-
the entire relevant time horizon. A state of the sented by the vector: (O.O,$iO,$iO,O,0), where
I
world is also called an outcome, or simply a
state. In an economic system, the relevant van-
the positions in the vector are in the same
order as the states listed above. Alternatively, a
ables might include the structure of the tax $2 trifecta bet on the ranking C-T-M that pays
I
I
code. global weather patterns, infant mortality
rates, scientific discoveries, etc. ‘I’he relevant
time horizon might be stated in periods as long
as a decade or as short as a second; it might cx-
tend into both the past and the future for a few
hours or many centuries.
off at 3-to-i odds has the payoff vector:
(O,O,O,O,$8,O).
In state-preference theory, a market is
equivalent to a payoff vector: a market repre-
sents the ability to exchange goods or payoffs.




At the racetrack, however, matters are much
simpler: a state of the world is a complete list-
ing of the finishing position for every horse in
today’s race,5 For example, if there are only
thre~horses in the race:
1. Tricky Bond
2. Mastercharger
~ Charge Me Interest
then there are six possible states of the world,
for a state-contingent bundle of post-race dol-
lars. Some exchanges are available directly: we
can exchange $2 pre-race for the post-race vec-
tor (O,O,$1O,$iO,O,O). Other exchanges can be
constructed indirectly: we might exchange $4
pre-race for the post-race vector (O,O,$iO,$iO,
$4,$4) by placing two separate $2 bets.
The key to the theory of complete markets is
to deal with such combinations in a systematic
I
which we can write in win-place-show order: fashion. A system of markets is complete when
4Some basic racing and betting terminology is defined in
the shaded insert on page 36. 5Note that if there were more than one race, a state of the world would involve a complete listing of all horses in all
races. In other words, a single state of the world describ-
ing all the day’s races would be ultimately realized.
6ln general, the number of permutations is given by the fac-
tonal function. E.g., 3! = 3-2-1 = 6.
7See the shaded insert on pp. 37-38 for a quick introduc-
tion to linear algebra.
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we can arrange a portfolio with any conceivable characte istic of a complete system of markets
payoff vector. We may not want certain payoff is that, without a wealth constraint, any con-
vectors, and even among tho e we do find de ceivable payoff vector can be arranged. In
sirable, our decision on which portfolio terms of hnear algebra, a complete ystem of
ultimately to arrange will depend both on their markets is one in which the set of available be s
prices and our resources, These i sues of desir- contains enough linearly independent payoff
ability and affordability are secondary for th vectors to span the space of all conceivable
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Suppose that the race is the three-horse affair
described earlier, To make things challenging,
further suppose that the resident bookmaker
will accept only win bets and place bets, refus-
ing to take the seemingly more complicated
quinellas, trifectas, etc.°Finally, to make com-
pleteness an intriguing proposition, suppose
that we get a hot tip from our pal in the stables
t
that the race is fixed: the final outcome will be
M-T-C. Because we trust our pal, we now want
to bet only on this single state of the world,
‘rhe key question for market completeness is:
can we do it, using only win and place bets?
First, note that we aren’t satisfied with a bet
on Mastercharger to win: in this bet, we would
also be buying a payoff in state M-C-T, which
we’re convinced won’t occur, With consistent
odds, our payoff per dollar wagered can’t be as
high betting Mastercharger to win (i,e,, betting
on the event, [M-T-C, M-C-T]), or betting Tricky
Bond to place (i,e,, the event, [T-M-C, T-C-M,
M-T-C, C-T-M]), as it would be on the M-T-C tn-
fecta bet,bo We want a portfolio of bets with a
payoff vector that looks like this: (O,O,x,O,O,O),
where x is some positive number, to make the
maximum profit on our bet, The number x
should equal exactly the payoff we would get
on the M-T-C trifecta bet, if only the bookmaker
would allow trifecta bets,
9Show bets are superfluous here, because in a three-horse
race, alt show bets automatically pay off. Thus, they’re not
really wagers at all. Also note that, although a trifecta
might seem complex, it is in a sense the simplest bet
here, because it pays off in only one state. This would not
be true of tnifecta bets if there were more than three
horses
or more than one race, 10”Consistent” simply means that the odds on any event
are inversely related to the probability, in the bookmaker’s
view, of it occurring — the more likely an event, the lower
its odds. Consistent odds are related to the probability of an event, e, by the formula: 0, = (1/P(e)) —1, where 0, is the odds ratio for the event e, and P(e) is the probability
that e will occur. With consistency, the probabilities of all
the individual outcomes add up to 100 percent,
It turns out we cannot achieve this payoff
vector from the available bets, an upshot of the
fact that this system of markets is not complete.
In practical terms, if the system of markets
were complete, then we could get higher odds
on a bet paying off in the event M-T-C than we
can get with the current incomplete set, as will
be demonstrated below,
To see more clearly what this means, let’s ex-
periment with the numbers, Suppose that the
bookmaker gives odds on the six allowable bets,
implying the six payoff vectors listed in table 1.
These payoffs have been rounded off to the
nearest penny. They include the initial wager of
$2 plus any profit from the wager, which
depends on the odds,”
To say that one of the bets is redundant
means that its payoffs in the six outcomes can
be replicated by an appropriate portfolio of the
other bets,’2The number of outcomes (six) equals
the number of bets (six), but exceeds the
number of non-redundant bets (five); the system
of markets is thus incomplete. Any payoff vec-
tor attainable by combinations of the six bets is
still attainable if we disallow one of the redun-
dant bets and include combinations consisting
only of the other five,
“To convert between odds and payoffs, use the formula:
p = b(1 +0,), where p is the payoff, b is the size of the
bet (e.g., $2), and 0, is the odds ratio (e.g., 7-3 odds imp-
ly 0, = 7/3 2.33).
“Redundancy requires that we be able to take bets as well
as place them. By taking bets, we can arrange for a nega-
tive payoff in certain events. For convenience, we assume
that the bookmaker at Portfolio Downs meets this need by
placing bets at his posted odds. It is also convenient if we
assume that bets can be both taken and placed in any













BET ODDS PAYMENT T-M-C Tc-M M-T-C M-~-T c-T-M c-M-T
Twins 7-3 —$2 S667 $667 0 0
T places 2-3 —52 ~ ~ ‘‘T’ ~ 53,33 ‘ 0 5333 0
M wins 4-1 -$2 0 1°f, 6Too ‘T”i~T”’o ‘t a” —
M places 9-1 1 — $2 $3 64 a ! 53,64 1 53,64 0 53,64
C wins 1-i —$2 0 - 0 --J oj 0, - $400 [ $400










BET ODDS PAYMENT T-M-C Tc-M !M-T-C M-c-T :~-T-M C-M-T
Twins 7-3 —$24 580001 580,00 !~ 00 --
Tplaces 2-3 $24 -S40,00!—$40.00 -S~0Oj0 Lz±~P±0 - 0 -
Mwir,s 4-1 —816 00 - $8000 $8000
M places 9-11 822 -$4000. 0 -340,00, —$40,20_i,_,_,~ ; —640,00
Gwins 1-1 —$40 0 0 0 - 0 - $8000 $8000
Total: - $34 0 $40.00 0 $40.00 $40.00 540.00
For example, we can construct the sixth bet
as a portfolio of the other five, Consider first a
$34 bet on Charge Me Interest to place” Ignor-
ing the rounding error, 17($2,35) = $4000, and
our payoffs would be (0,$40,0,$40,$40,$40) un-
der the six possible outcomes, Now consider a
portfolio that consists of different amounts of
the other five bets, either taken (negative pay-
offs) or placed (positive payoffs), In particular,
let the amounts be those listed in table 2, For
example, we take 12 $2 bets on Tricky Bond to
place, while placing 12 $2 bets on the same
horse to win, The payoffs to our portfolio are
given by totaling the six columns in the table,
The portfolio yields the same result as if we
had placed a $34 bet on Charge Me Interest to
place. In fact, since we placed $80 in bets while
taking $46 worth, our net investment in the
portfolio is $(—80+46) = —$34, The fact that
equivalent payoff vectors require the same in-
vestment reveals that our bookmaker has set
the odds (i,e,, payoffs) in a consistent way.
One way to look at the redundancy of one of
our bets is that we cannot synthesize the trifec-
ta bet that we’re after. Even though we would
place such a bet at any consistent positive odds
(because we’re convinced we know the outcome~
that bet is neither offered directly nor can we
synthesize it from the others, In other words,
we can’t get there from here,
Gompleting The Market
Another way to look at this is that the book-
maker’ can drop a redundant bet from the list
of allowable bets without affecting our oppor-
tunities, it turns out that, in our example, the
six bets are mutually redundant: any bet that is
omitted can be reconstituted from the remain-
ing five, The same procedure that was just used
to reconstitute the sixth bet could be applied to
generate any of the individual bets from the
other five,” Let’s drop a bet then and replace it
with a non-redundant bet-
For example, suppose the bookmaker does not
offer a bet on Mastercharger to place. Instead
of that bet, he gives 3-1 odds on a trifecta bet
on the ranking C-M-T, ‘The odds and the implicit
payoffs now available to us are given in table 3,
‘rhe fourth row of the original payoff array has
been replaced by the payoffs to the new tn-
fecta bet, The question is still whether we can
arrange a portfolio of bets that pays off only
when the ranking is M-T-C, That is, can we syn-
thesize an M-T-C trifecta bet? More generally, is
the system of markets complete? The answer to
both questions is yes. The system of markets is
complete, which implies that we can achieve
any payoff vector, including the payoff vector
that corresponds to an M-T-C trifecta bet,
To synthesize that bet, combine the bets as
descr’ibed in table 4. The result is a net two-
dollar investment that only pays off if the final
outcome of the race is M-T-C, The payoff in
that case is $40, implying 19-to-i odds,” By
creating a bet that pays off under such narrow
circumstances, we have maximized the return
on our $2 investment (assuming our pal in the
stables is trustworthy!), With a complete system
of markets, of course, we can also generate a
safer portfolio—that is, one that pays off in
“Using 17 two-dollar tickets ($34) simply keeps all the
following payoffs in terms of nice round numbers. We
could just as welt scale all the amounts and payoffs down
by a factor of 17 to show the same result,
“This is not necessarily the case with redundant bets. Con-
sider, for example, three redundant bets on two outcomes:
(0,1), (1,1) and (2,2). If (2,2) is dropped, it can be
reconstituted from (1,1). If (0,1) is dropped, however, it
cannot be synthesized from (II) and (2,2).
“Again, the scale of the payoffs is unimportant here, Forty
dollar amounts are used to keep the numbers consistent
with the previous example, The important result is that the
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Table 3
PAYOFFS BY OUTCOME
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more states—but this would be more costly. For
example, to get the same payoff in one addi-
tional outcome, M-C-T (i.e., to achieve the payoff
vector (0,0,$40,$40,0,0)), would require an $8
bet on Mastercharger to win, a four-fold in-
crease from the investment required for the
trifecta bet,
It is no accident that the number of bets in
the portfolio equals the number of possible out-
comes,1°Every portfolio we construct is a sys-
tem of six linear equations in some unknowns,
namely the amounts to put into each of the
allowable bets, In other words, we start with
six state-dependent payoffs (the desired payoff
vector), and we seek a combination of weights
(ic,, investment amounts) for the available bets
that yield those six payoffs. To ensure that such
a combination exists, we need at least six un~
knowns (ic., available bets) to work with, Fur-
thermore, some collection of six of those avail-
able bets must have payoff vectors that are lin-
early independent.
“An allowable bet is included in the count, even if the
amount wagered on that bet is zero, The decision to
wager nothing on a particular allowable bet is an implicit
portfolio decision,
“‘We shall see below that this situation is not usually a prac-
tical consideration, The normal problem is that there are
not enough unknowns (available bets) rather than too
many.
What if there are more unknowns than equa-
tions (i.e., more available bets than elements in
the desired payoff vector)?” In that case, at




in determining whether the system
is complete, it is not safe simply to
tions and unknowns; we must find
collection of non-redundant bets, In our exam-
ple, if we can find six non-redundant bets, then
every payoff vector is the result of a unique
combination of these six bets. Thus, in our ex-
ample, the only way to achieve the payoff (0,0,
$40,0,0,0) is to combine the bets in the amounts
($12, —$24,0, —$10,$20,0)
Finally, there is one last bit of terminology
which appears frequently in state-preference
theory. In our example, a trifecta bet has a posi-
tive payoff in one state only; in all other states,
its payoff is zero, Notice that all other bets con-
sist of various collections of trifecta bets. Clear-
ly then, a set of six different trifecta bets would






leads to the notion of a reference bet or pure
security. A pure security is a normalized bet
that pays off in only one state. By normalized,
we mean that the payoff in the selected state is
one unit)8 To get a normalized payoff) we must
adjust the amount invested in that bet. The
wager amount that implies the normalized
payoff is called the price of the pure securicv.
Any state-contingent claim can be regarded as a
collection of pure securities. A system of mar-
kets is complete if and only if the number of
attainable pure securities (either directly or
through combination of other securities) equals
the number of outcomes.
SOME ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
Historically, the theoretical economics
literature has generally followed two distinct,
but entirely compatible hnes in interpreting and
applying the theory of complete markets. First,
led by the initiators of the theory) there were
applications to the problem of general equilib-
rium. Most work in this area now starts with
the notion that markets are not complete and
proceeds to analyze the nature of equilibrium
(or disequihbrium) with incomplete marketsJ~
The other line of research has focused on the
relative efficiency of financial markets at alloca-
ting risk by providing greater investment flex-
ibility to investors, in the same way that a com-
plete system of markets makes bettors better
off at Portfolio Downs. In practice, the general
equilibrium applications tend to de-emphasize
uncertainty and concentrate on production, con-
sumption and intertemporal optimization. Con-
versely, the financial market applications tend
to ignore real resource constraints and temporal
factors, in order to concentrate on uncertainty.
The first section of this paper considered the
properties of betting odds at an imaginary race-
track. Our goal in that example was to find
some conditions that would ensure complete in-
vestment flexibility. In the process, we devel-
oped a simple context in which to introduce the
terminology of complete markets. An analogy
can be made between Portfolio Downs and real
markets. Bookmakers manage their risk by lay-
ing off bets, while investors manage their risk
by hedging their portfolios; bettors are unsure
whether Tricky Bond will win the race, while
investors are unsure if pet rocks will be
popular with consumers; etc.2°Our next task is
to flesh out this analogy to see what importance
state-preference theory can have for more gen-




One of the primary insights of state-preference
theory is that the traditional notion of what
constitutes an economic good can be readily ex-
tended in a way that allows us to examine
economic behavior across time and under un-
certainty. At the same time, this extension
forces us to think of ‘goods” in a very different
way. Our notion of a good is broadened in two
directions: time and state.
Examining the time dimension first, consider a
simple example involving a banana and an apple.
A textbook would tell us that each consumer
has a set of preferences such that she either
prefers one to the other or is indifferent be-
tween them. In our new way of looking at
things, however, we must include a time dimen-
sion in a description of the commodity. From
this new perspective, “apple” is not sufficient to
describe a good; one must specify either “apple
today” or “apple tomorrow.” Merely specifying
“apple” is analogous to stating “red” without
specifying “red tricycle” or “red Ferrari.”
To make the example more specific, suppose
that our consumer generally prefers apples at
time t, A,, to bananas, B,, but that variety is also
valuable to her. In this case, the following pre-
ferences for consumption over two consecutive
days might hold:
IBAt Portfolio Downs everything is measured in dollars, so a
pure security would be a trifecta bet that paid $1 if the
outcome was the ranking specified in the bet. Pure secur-
ities are also called Arrow-Debreu securities or primitive
securitie&
19See Geanakoplos (1990) for some examples.
20The terms “laying off bets,” ‘covering a position,” and
‘hedging or reinsuring a portfolio” all refer to the same
basic process of reversing a transaction with one party
by making a countermanding transaction with a third party.
For example, a bookmaker who takes a large bet on some
event from a bettor can lay it off by placing a bet on the
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Sequence of fruits
apple today, banana tomorrow
banana today, apple tomorrow
apple today, apple tomorrow
banana today, banana tomorrow,
where the bundles (i.e., payoff vectors) are of
the form: (A0,A,,B0,B). With our new definition
of commodities in mind, the four sequences
ranked above can be treated under standard
utility theory exactly as four commodity bun-
dles, each composed of a pair of the four dif-
ferent commodities. One might consider, for
example, the indifference curves between ap-
ples today and bananas today, or budgeting
between apples today and apples tomorrow.
An infinite number of other bundles could
also be described and ranked, of course. For
example, (15,0,3,7) is a possible bundle, one that
would be preferable to any of those listed
above. Restricting the time dimension to two
days and considering the resulting four goods,
we see that the system of markets defined by
the four bundles here is incomplete: we can get
bundle 1 by buying bundles 3 and 4 while sell-
ing bundle 2. Thus, there are at most three
non-redundant markets for four goods.2~
Uncertainty
The same approach is used to incorporate
uncertainty. To do so, the definition of a com-
modity is expanded to include the state of the
world. Thus, for example, an umbrella in the
rain is now a fundamentally different commod-
ity from an umbrella on a sunny day22 Simi-
larly, “bananas in peacetime” are different from
“bananas in wartime.” This new application, however, fundamentally expands our notion of
a good, Because states of the world, by defini-
tion, are mutually exclusive, we must separate the notion of economic consumption from that of physical consumption. For example, if we
purchase the bundle of goods consisting of “an
apple in peacetime tomorrow” and “a banana in wartime tomorrow,” we shall not be eating both
apple and banana tomorrow; we shall eat only
one or the other,
Because the additional consideration of time
and uncertainty forces such a radical shift in
our conception of commodities, it is worthwhile
to consider it further. The distinctions between
apples and bananas, today and tomorrow, and
peace and war serve as a simple basis for an
example Suppose that, today, the political situa-
tion is peaceful, but tomorrow’s situation is un-
certain. This implies two possible states of the
world: peace today, peace tomorrow, and peace
today, war tomorrow. We thus have six com-
modities, abbreviated as follows:23
Commodity Abbreviation
Suppose now that the local wholesaler, Whim-
sical Fruits, sells the “fruit baskets” or state
claims described in table 5.
This admittedly contrived example (note, for
example, that basket No. 4 consists of 364 ap-
ples today and 364 apples tomorrow, plus 364
“bonus” bananas to be delivered only in case of
war tomorrow) allows for ready interpretation,
because of its similarity to an earlier example.
The array of goods here is essentially identical
to the payoff array for Portfolio Downs; only
the labels and the scale have been changed. At
Portfolio Downs, the only distinction between
goods was the state of the world; the physical
commodity in all cases was cash, and time dif-
ferences did not exist. At Whimsical Fruits, on
the other hand, the goods have different inter-
pretations, and all the amounts are scaled up by
a factor of 100; otherwise, the payoff array is
identical to that in table 1, We can therefore
conclude immediately that the fruit market here
is incomplete, For example, a buyer wanting on-
ly to buy apples to be delivered tomorrow in
21There is, of course, no reason to limit the time dimension
to two days. By extending the time dimension indefinitely,
we get an infinite number of goods, which would require
an infinite number of markets for a complete system.
22street vendors in New York, for example, charge $3 for an
umbrella under clear skies, and $5 for an umbrella when
it’s raining,
23Note that there are only two states of the world, distin-
guished by the political situation tomorrow. Thus, for the
commodities dated today, the true state of the world is
uncertain, although the current political situation is known
to be peace. In principle, therefore, we should distinguish
between apple-peace tomorrow-today and apple-war
tomorrow-today. As a practical matter, however, we cannot
observe this distinction until it is too late for it to affect our


































NUMBER OF FRUIT IN EACH BASKET
BASKET PAYMENT } A-.-O 8-.-O , A-P•1 A-Wi B-P-i B-W-i
1 —$200 L,_667 .667 , 00 0 i 0
2 —8200 333 333 333 0 333 I 0
3 —$200 0 i 0 1000 1000 0 0
÷ --—— - 4 —$200 364 i 0 ‘ 364 364 0 364
5 —$200 0 ~‘ 0 0 0 400 400
8 —$200 0 235 0 ‘ 235 . 235 235
case of peace cannot arrange such a transaction
as a mixture of the baskets offered at Whim-
sical Fruits.
Do Complete Markets Really Exist?
We now have a sufficient context to ask
whether markets are complete in reality. The
answer from economists who have considered
this question is a resounding “No.”24 The prob-
lem is the huge number of markets that would
be required for completeness to hold, Even with
the roughest distinctions (e.g., measuring time
in one-year intervals, considering all automo-
biles in a given year as perfect substitutes, etc.),
an astonishing number of states of the world
must still be considered. For example, every
conceivable future invention must be included.
Furthermore, the timing of invention is signifi-
cant; if a cure for cancer comes in 1.997 instead
of 1998, that implies a different state of the
world. Some would have us distinguish goods
by geographical location and even by the iden-
tity of the final consumer! 25 We need to mul-
tiply the number of states by the number of
periods and then by the number of physical
goods and services. Finally, we need a market
with which to exchange every one of these
many goods with every other one.
The absence of many markets from a real
economy may be explained by transaction costs.
For example, a contract for “an apple dated
2006 if a cure for cancer is discovered in 1997”
is too costly to arrange, relative to the marginal
benefit of such a transaction. Such a commodity
is too narrowly defined to be of interest.
Turning to a more plausible example, the
International Monetary Market (1MM) of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) established
an organized marketplace for several commod-
ity futures contracts in 1973. Among these were
contracts for (1) bagged silver Canadian coins
worth C$ 5,000 at face value, and (2) 12,500,000
Japanese yen.2°While futures trading in silver
coins was discontinued several months later
after trading volume dwindled, yen futures still
trade today with thousands of contracts chang-
ing hands every business day.
In hindsight, it seems clear that the conve-
nience provided by a market for bagged Cana-
dian silver coins was outweighed by transaction
costs of some form.27 On the other hand, the
successful introduction of a market for yen fu-
tures suggests that investors would have faced
significant portfolio constraints in their absence.
The contrast between these two raises an inter-
esting question: are the incomplete systems of
markets observed in the real world efficient in
the sense that the missing markets are absent
because they are not operationally cost-effective
given current trading technology? Or, are they
incomplete simply because no one has thought
24fladner (1982), p. 930, for example, states that”... it clear-
ly requires that the economic agents possess capabilities
of imagination and calculation that exceed reality by many
orders of magnitude.” Geanakoplos (1990), p. 2, states
that, “There is little doubt that permitting the incomplete-
ness of asset markets is a step in the direction of
realism.”
25See, for example, Geanakoplos (1987), p. 116. This last
distinction is made in analyzing public goods and
externalities.
265ee Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1974, 1989). All futures
contracts specify a future time and place for delivery, in
addition to other standardizations. The state-contingent
nature of markets for futures and options is considered in
greater detail in later examples.
270ne possible explanation is that the payoffs to coin futures
lie in the space spanned by linear combinations of Cana-
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to provide the services required to match buy-
ers and sellers?
A full answer, unfortunately, is beyond the
scope of this paper, although we return briefly
to the issue below when considering futures
markets. It is not a simple task to identify be-
forehand which missing markets impose the
most significant constraints by their absence,
and thus would be most likely to succeed with
investors. The theory of complete markets does
tell us, however, that, contingent on the level of
transaction costs, identifying and providing such
markets can make everyone involved better off.
Not surprisingly then, much of the theoretical
work in this area investigates the properties of
economies where markets are incomplete. Some
of the issues involved are presented in the fol-
lowing examples.





and Bubbles gets all three fat portions.3°Despite
their differences, Jack and Bubbles recognize
the value of trade. For example, the vector \~ in
the figure represents a sale of one pork chop
from Bubbles to Jack, where Jack owns one
pork chop before the sale and two pork chops
afterward.
Because there are two commodities but only
one transaction (i.e., one payoff vector) in this
example, the set of markets is incomplete. The
single available market spans the 45-degree line
in the payoff space of both consumers; each
consumer can achieve any payoff where the
number of fat and lean portions is given by
some multiple of (1,1). Unfortunately, the opti-
mal point, A”, does not lie in the space spanned
by this available market. The upshot is that the
system of markets is incomplete, implying a sub-
optimal allocation of resources. In other words,
the allocation of the six (fat and lean) portions
here ideally would be represented by A~ the
unique Pareto-optimal allocation. The available
market does not allow them to trade to this
Ii
Figure I















We first examine one of the most basic pro-
blems in economics: how to arrange for the
best allocation of available resources. Consider the nursery rhyme of Jack Sprat, but suppose that Jack and his wife, Bubbles, are now di-
vorced and living separately.25 For simplicity,
let’s ignore uncertainty and the time dimension. The local market has a special on pork chops,
which consist of one fat portion and one lean
portion,
for $P per pork chop.29 This can be









Now consider the allocation of a fixed set of
pork chops, say three chops. between Jack and
Bubbles. We represent this situation by the
modified Edgeworth box in figure 1. Given the
special preferences of Jack and Bubbles, there is
a unique optimal allocation in this example, rep-
resented by the point A” in the lower-right-hand
corner of the box. This is the point at which
Jack gets all three lean portions of pork,
29Recall that: “Jack Sprat could eat no fat I His wife could
eat no lean I And so betwixt them both I They licked the
platter clean.”
29Note:”To market,to market,to buy a fat pig/Home again,
home again, jiggety-jig.”
30The optimal allocation is called Pareto-efficient by
economists. With a Pareto-efficient allocation, no one can
be made better off without harming someone else, In this
particular example, there is only one Pareto-efficient
allocation, because of the extreme nature of the prefer-
ences. In a less extreme case, there would be many
Pareto-efficient allocations, depending on preferences, in-
itial endowments and relative prices.
a
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allocation, however, and Jack’s fat goes to
waste, as does Bubbles’ lean, Now, let’s complete
the system of markets by adding a second al-
lowable transaction: say that Jack and Bubbles
agree to trim the fat from the chops and sell it
separately to one another at a price of $P/2 per







The vector \‘ in the figure represents the sale
of a single fat portion from Jack back to Bub-
bles. By thus completing the market, we have
made the optimal allocation attainable.”
This same principle of allocational efficiency
can be seen at work in more general settings.
The major contribution of Arrow and Debreu
was to show that an efficient allocation of all
commodities is feasible for an economy with
complete markets, even with many periods,
many physical goods and services, and uncer-
tainty about the future.” We next illustrate the
importance of complete markets in this context,
without considering a full general equilibrium
model.
Future8 Markets and Risk-Shjfting
Uncertainty is a salient concern in many mar-
kets, It is common for contracts to require
alternative payoffs in different states, Commod-
ity futures contracts, for example, specify the
exact physical characteristics of the commodity,
the date of delivery and the location of delivery;
moreover, they typically provide that ‘If deliv-
ery or acceptance or any precondition or re-
quirement of either is prevented by a strike,
fire, accident, action of government or act of
God,” the directors of the exchange will decide
the duties of buyer and seller.”
From a practical perspective, ho\vever, the im-
plicit state-dependent nature of such contracts
is much more important than such explicit stip-
ulations, Commodity futures contracts enable
owners of a physical commodity to hedge the
value of their inventory exactly against uncer-
tain future fluctuations in price. The state-
preference approach can provide useful insights
into the nature of such markets,
Futures markets allow people to contract to-
day for future delivery of a specific commodity
at a specific price. To see why such a contract
is valuable, consider a hypothetical cotton
market without a futures market, In particular,
suppose that the current price of cotton is 71
cents per pound ($35.50 for a 50-lb. bale), and
there are two states of the world, In one state,
the price of cotton will increase to 80 cents per
pound; in the other, it will fall to 70 cents per
pound. Finally, assume borrowing and lending
are possible at an interest rate of 5 percent
over the period. Using the tools of state-
preference theory, we can set up the payoff ar-
ray in table 6. There will ultimately only be two
cash markets for cotton here. We can either
transact now in the spot market, or we can
transact later in whichever of the two subse-
quent spot markets is available,
The Hedger
Now consider the situation of a cotton farmer
who will harvest 25 tons of cotton in the com-
ing period. To restrict the number of contingen-
cies, we treat the size of the crop as certain, In
terms of state-claims, this is the endowment
(not a transaction) described in table 7. Finally,
assume the farmer is risk-averse and wants his
cash receipts to be the same, regardless of the
state of the world, In other words, he wants
a final consumption bundle, after harvesting
and selling the crop, as described in table 8,
Note that we must restrict the payoff $X to be
strictly greater than $35,000 here, Otherwise,
the farmer could achieve a certain payoff of
$35,000 by giving away $5,000 in the high-price
state of the world, The potential for arbitrage
implies that he should be able to do better than
this, Can he achieve his desired payoff with the
current set of markets?
31starting from the same initial allocation, where Jack has
one chop and Bubbles two, Jack buys both chops from
Bubbles and then sells back to her the three fat portions.
32This is their proof of the existence of an efficient general
equilibrium in an economy with complete markets, See
Geanakoplos (1987) for an overview,
“See Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1983), p. 8.





I The answer is no: to convert his certain crop into a certain dollar payoff, he requires a for- ward sale contract of the form described in
I table 9. Such a contract does not exist here, nor can it be synthesized as a combination of avail- able contracts. In terms of our earlier discus-
sion, the system of markets is incomplete. In
I
this case, the incompleteness prevents the
farmer from arranging his desired payoff vec-
tor, Let’s consider two ways of alleviating this
constraint by completing the system of markets.
First, let’s add storage (and leasing) of the
physical commodity to the list of allowable tran-
sactions. In this example, no price is charged
to store or lease cotton, although such a price
could readily be included, In our simplified two-
state, two-period example, this is sufficient to
complete the system of markets. The payoff
array is now given in table 10. To arrange the
desired bundle, the farmer can now arrange the
transactions in table 11, converting his endow-
ment into a certain dollar amount next period.
In other words, the farmer leases 25 tons of
cotton, sells it for cash today and invests the
proceeds, repaying the borrowed cotton when
his own crop is harvested. Thus, it is possible,
















TRANSACTION CURRENT Cotton Cotton Cotton ‘ Cash Cash
COST Now Later Later Later , Later
th 706 ci 80’ ‘‘1 70’ ‘~ eo~
Buy now .535,500 4 -
Buy i~70’ 02 5 tons 0 --$35000 0
Buyc~B0’ 00 0 25t0n5 9.~
Borrow cash $100 00 , 0 —SW5 —$105
.t—-. t..- --- •i ..-
Store cotton 0 —25 tons 25 tons 25 tons 0 0
Table 11
STATE CLAIM PAYOFFS
TRANSACTION CURRENT Cotton Cotton Cotton ‘ Cash Cash
COST Now Later Later Later Later
~7
0
c ‘~ 80’ ‘U 70’ 2z so:
Lease cotton 0 - 25 tons’ —2stons 4 ._T25 t2~~
Sell now $35,500 —25 tons ~ 0: 0 40 I -. 0
Lend —535.500 0 00 $37,275 ‘ $37,275
Total: 0 0 — 25 tons —25 tons $37,275 537,215
Table 12
STATE CLAIM PAYOFFS
TRANSACTION CURRENT Cotton Cotton Cotton Cash Cash
COST Now Later Later Later Later
w 70 (ci 80’ @ 7Q6 cit 80’
Ritures 0 0 —SOIb. J —501b
I
the crop. ‘his is achieved, however, through a There are three lessons here. First and fore-
circuitous and potentially costly chain of three most, completing the system of markets makes
transactions. Why shouldn’t the farmer arrange everyone better off (or at least not worse off)
the desired transaction directly as a single by allowing risk to be transferred from the
contract? farmer to a speculator. Second, there is more
- than one way to complete an incomplete system This is precisely the role of a futures contract, , - of markets. rhird, some means of completing a
our second means of completing this system of -
-‘ . system of markets may be more cost-effective
markets. A futures contract would have just .- -
than others. One might even plausibly conjec-
thts payoff vector, perhaps adjusted by a scale -
- ture that all missing markets result from trans-
factor. A cotton future is a standardized for- - action costs that render them cost-ineffective.
ward sale contract; i.e., a contract to pay a spe-
-- . - Confirming or refuting such a conjecture, how-
cified price (P) for a standardized quantity (oO -
-- . ever, is beyond the scope of this paper.
lbs. of cotton) at a specific time (next period),re-
gardless of the state of the world, as described
in table 12. The futures contract makes the
marketplace more flexible; in our simple exam- The Speculator
pie, it completes the system of markets. It
allows the farmer to transfer directly the price The same transaction can also be considered
risk associated with commodity ownership with- from the perspective of the speculator who
out transferring ownership of the commodity buys a futures contract from the farmer. A
per se. speculator is someone who wagers that she can
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accurately predict the state of the world.34 To This concentrates the speculator’s return on the




futures markets, we start with a market that
allows for storage (and leasing) of cotton. If we
omit cotton storage, as in table 6, then the sys
tem of markets is incomplete; the speculator is
thus prevented from arranging her desired pay-
off vector. Once again we complete the market
in two different ways: with commodity market
speculation and with futures market
speculation.
In other words, to speculate on the low-price
outcome in this world, the speculator must sell
the physical commodity short. This requires
leasing the commodity, selling it in the spot
market and repurchasing the cotton later when
the price has changed. These four transactions
imply a profit if the cotton price falls and a
loss if it rises. Finally, the speculator invests
an amount equal to the discounted value of the
I
To make the problem more general, we now
represent contract quantities (measured in lbs.
of cotton) by C, and prices (measured as cents
per lb. of cotton) by P. There are three prices,
the current spot price P0, low price ~L and a
future high price P11 (where P11 >Pj. There is a
single fixed interest rate R, at which the
speculator can borrow and lend money. This
payoff array is given in table 13. Let’s say the
speculator believes the low-price state will oc-
cur. In particular, she wants to arrange a trans-
cotton in the high price state. If this state oc-
curs, then the cost of repurchasing the cotton
will be exactly covered by the investment; if the
low price state occurs, the investment more
than covers the repurchase of the cotton, and
the difference is a speculative profit. The cur-
rent cost of this basket is the proceeds of the
spot sale, P0C, less the amount that must be in-
vested, P11C/(1 +fl). This must be negative—i.e., a
positive cost to the speculator—if an arbitrage
opportunity is to be avoided.
action that pays only cash in the low price One must question the practicality of such a
state. She can accomplish this by arranging the transaction, however. Once again, there is more
bundle of transactions described in table 14. than one way to complete a system of markets.
34Note that the speculator is not necessarily a consumer of
cotton. Indeed, a cotton consumer (e. g., a clothing manu-
facturer) is likely to be as risk-averse as the farmer. In






TRANSACTION CURRENT Cotton Cotton Cotton Cash Cash
COST Now Later ‘ Later Later Later
:~PL @PL
Sell Standard Fjtu’es 0 0 —50 lb --50 lb ~F ‘
Bu~ ‘~ ~L 0 0 50 lb 0 Pj.. 0
Buv~P~ 00 SOIb , ..•
cash Settlement Fut-jres 00 ‘ 0 0
Although shoit sales are commonplace in the
stock market, for example, such transactions
can be considerably more difficult when dealing
with physical commodities. If a market for cot-
ton futures is available, however, the speculator
can arrange her desired bundle without evei
having to store or lease a physical commodity.
Indeed, most futures contracts are retired by a
process called cash settlement, which obviates
any transfer of the physical commodity.
In effect, a cash settlement futures contract
(table 15) is a bundle of transactions sold as a
single unit, where P. is the futures price. Note
that, to eliminate arbitrage here, it must be the
case that ~F~L > 0 > P6 P11. Such a standar-
dized contract facilitates the transfer’ of i-isk
from hedgers to speculators. Moreover, with
cash settlement, the speculator never has to
handle the physical commodity sold in the fu-
tures contract, thus reducing transaction costs.
Options and .tnvestor Fleyibility
‘The preceding example illustrated how the
introduction of a futures contract, a paper
transaction, could improve the allocation of re-
sources in an economy.’6 Such applications of
state-preference theory are not limited to the
futures markets. Art-ow (1964) showed that the
ability to reallocate risk without otherwise con-
straining economic activity is a general property
of securities markets. This principle can also he
seen at work in the options market.” ln con-
sidering an options example, we abstract from
the issues of timing and consumption and
concentrate on uncem’tainty, to streamline the
example.
Options markets are especially useful for- shift-
ing risks, because of a special characteristic of
an option contract. In particular, a call option
specifies a strike price, labeled K, at which the
holder of the option can purchase the underly-
ing commodity.’~By simply changing the strike
price in an option contract, we can create a
fundamentally different financial security. Thus,
a ‘single” options market provides the oppor-tu-
nitv to exchange a multitude of state claims. To
see how this works, consider the following
example.
The Chicago Board of Trade Options Exchange
(CBOE) trades options on the Standard and
Poors’ 500 stock index (S&,P 500), among other
things.” A call option on the S&P 500 with
striking price of 295, theoretically gives the op-
“In general, in order to eliminate arbitrage opportunities,
every payoff vector must involve a trade-off, in which some
element (including the current cost) of every vector is
negative and some element of every vector is positive. In
other words, every vector must represent an exchange of
some sort rather than a unilateral gift.
36In one sense, we have reallocated risk rather than
resources. Recall, however, that we have redefined goods,
so that cotton in the high-price state is a different resource
from cotton in the low-price state.
“For more thorough analyses of options and complete mar-
kets, see Ross (1976), and Arditti and John (1980).
‘8The ‘commodity” in most options markets is really a
share of a corporation’s common stock. However, there
are also organized options exchanges for cattle, copper,
crude oil, Canadian dollars, etc. See the shaded insert on
pp. 51-52 for a basic description of option contracts.
“The S&P 500 is a weighted average of 500 common
stocks. The amount of each stock included in the index is
pro-rated according to the value of that stock, where the
value is defined as the price per share times the number
of shares outstanding. The value of the index is then scal-
ed down to make the base period index (1941 -43) worth
ID units; if the S&P 500 today is worth 295, for example, it
is worth 29.5 times as much as it was in 1943. Thus, the
price of the S&P 500 is not, strictly speaking, a dollar
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receives in cash $500 times the difference be-
tween the value of the index and the striking
price, if this difference is positive, and nothing
otherwise.”
To simplify our example, we limit the number
of possible outcomes as before and ignore the
time dimension. As at Portfolio Downs, there
are only two relevant times: before the true
outcome is revealed and afterward. Each state
of the world corresponds to a different value
for the S&P 500:











tion holder the right to purchase the S&P 500
index at 295.”°Because the weighting scheme
involved in constructing the index involves 500
stocks, many held in fractional quantities, all of
~‘hich must then be scaled down to a relative
value, however, it is impossible to purchase the
exact S&P 500 index. Instead, cash settlement is
used: at maturity, the holder of a call option
Thus, our option to buy at 295 is a state claim.
In the event that the value of the S&P 500 itself
is less than 295, then the option is worthless,
because the (approximate) index can be pur-
chased in the open market for less than the
strike price. If the index is worth more than
295, then the option is worth $500 times the
difference between the actual price and the
strike price. This is summarized in table 16.
It should be clear from our earlier examples
that this system of markets is not complete.
There is no way, for example, to arrange a
portfolio that pays off exactly $50,000 if the
S&,P 500 is below 300 and zero otherwise; i.e.,
($50000,$50000,$50000,0,0,0). The special char-
acteristic of options markets, however, is that
linearly independent payoff vectors can be
achieved by changing the striking price alone.
Because of this, numerous options on the same
security are actively traded. Many of these op-
tions differ only in their striking prices. Adding
some of these options to our example, we get
the payoff array in table 17.
This system of markets is complete. To achieve
the payoff vector ($50000,$50000,$50000,0,0,0),
for example, we can transact the amounts of
the six listed call options described in table 18.
“°Theunits for the option contract must be rescaled to give
a dollar value. In particular, option contracts are for $500
times the level of the index. For example, to exercise a
call option at strike price 295 would cost $500 x 295
$147,500.
41For example, an investor exercising a call option at strike
price 295 when the index itself is at 290 would receive































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stion of goods. This can be seen in the a[location
of risks in futures and options markets, the abil-
ity to refine payoffs at the racetrack, or the dis-
tribution of fat and lean between Jack Sprat
and his wife, Bubbles. The common implication
in each example is that additional markets can
improve the welfare of all concerned. That is,
given the ability to reallocate, individuals will do
so: they will exchange relatively less desirable
commodity bundles for those that are, for them,
relatively more desirable. A complete system of
markets provides this ability. Thus, an economy
~‘vithgreater flexibility in production, consump-
tion and investment is uniformly preferable to
one with less.
A second recurring theme is uncertainty.
Review Questions
(1) Using the payoff array in table 3, construct
a book of bets that amounts to a pure
security for the outcome T-C-M; i. e., make a
book with the payoff vector (0,$1,0,0,0,0).
What is the net investment required for this
book of bets?
(2) Using the payoff array in table 3,, what is
the probability, implicit in the bookmaker’s
odds, that the outcome of the race will be
i’-C-M?
(3) Suppose the bookmaker offers a redundant
bet with inconsistent odds. In particular,
suppose the last bet in the payoff array in
table 1 is changed, yielding the new array in
table Qi. Construct an arbitrage portfolio (a
portfolio that shows a positive net profit in
all outcomes) from these bets.
(4) Ross shows that a necessary condition for
a collection of securities to span the state
space is that, ‘for any two states there must
be some asset whose payoffs distinguish bet-
ween them.”1 Suppose we have instead a
market in which no asset can distinguish
between two states. In particular, consider
State-preference theory and the theory of com-
plete markets are one way to incorporate un-
certainty systematically in an economic model.
This is central to a theory that includes an un-
certain state of the world as a fundamental at-
tribute of a good. One result is a recognition
of the value of the ability to reallocate risk
through financial transactions. While specula-
tion in financial markets may or may not he un-
fettered gambling, the implicit transfer of risk
from hedgers to speculators still produces eco-
nomic value. ‘I’he theory of complete markets
thus provides a systematic explanation for the
popularity and value of many so-called deriva-




the payoff array in table Q2, in which states
E and F are indistinguishable by the avail-
able assets. Show that this system of mar-
kets is incomplete.
(5) Consider a speculator in the cotton market
who believes that the price will rise. Assume
that storage (and leasing) of cotton is not
practical, but that a cash settlement futures
market exists. In other words, assume the
allowable transactions are those in table Q3.
What sort of payoff vector might this specu-
lator want? Flow could she construct it from
the available transactions?
(6) Consider a banker facing the transactions
available in table Q4 over the next 30 days
in the international financial markets, where
S is the spot foreign exchange rate (~/$),
and B~ and R5 are the foreign and domestic
30-day interest rates. Is this system of
markets complete? Suppose the banker
wants to arrange a forward exchange con-
tract of the form presented in table Q5. Ar-
range such a payoff from the available
transactions. What does the forward rate F
equal? What is the intuition behind this
value for the forward rate?
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Answers to the Review Questions
(1)Try:(30C,—G0C,20C,--25c,1000,—85C). there are six states and five non-redundant
The net investment is 20C. securities—the system of markets is
(2) Odds are given by: incomplete.
= 1.00—20 = 4 = 4-to-I odds. (,5)She would want to purchase a payoff I C .20 Z >1 in the high-price state, as described in table Al. This could be obtained by the
I = 4 P(e) = -~ = 20%. transactions listed in table A2.
P(e) (WYes, it is complete. Combine the trans-
actions listed in table A3. Thus, F =
(3)Try: ($240) —$240,$160, —$2204400, —$320)- S(1 + R~) 1(1 + R5). This is simply a statement
(4)Compare: (0,0,0,0,1,0) with: (0,0,0,0,0,1), of the covered interest parity condition,
where the elements of the vectors repre- F(1 + R5) = S(1 + R ,~),which prevents arbi-
sent the numbers of each option to buy or trage between money markets in different
I F sell. The last two options are redundant: countries.
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